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## WEEKLY REPORT



# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

17 November 1965

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY  
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE

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State Dept., DIA reviews completed

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM  
(11 November - 17 November 1965)

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	iv
Map, South Vietnam, facing page	1
I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM	1
A. POLITICAL SITUATION	1

Premier Ky's recent absence while visiting South Korea was occasion for new signs of discontent in the Catholic community (p. 1); I Corps commander General Thi and backers also becoming increasingly assertive (p. 1); departing South Vietnamese ambassador has commented unfavorably on Ky regime (p. 2); Saigon press also less optimistic about prospects for political stability (p. 3); Viet Cong warn of possible retaliation for execution of any of 18 Vietnamese recently tried for treason (p. 3); Viet Cong also last week instigated larger than usual number of demonstrations (p. 3); retail prices continue downward trend (p. 3); maritime strike may be near settlement (p. 4).

25X1

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25X1

Page

## B. MILITARY SITUATION

5

Combat activity increased last week, with accompanying sharp rise in Communist personnel losses (p. 5); Results of major operations by South Vietnamese and allied forces were generally favorable, with one exception (p. 5); marked decrease in contacts with suspected Viet Cong junks noted (p. 6); B-52 raids flown against 11 targets (p. 6); major Viet Cong - initiated activity took place in II and III Corps (p. 6); interdiction of roads and rail lines is outlined (p. 7).

Map, Transportation Routes, facing page

8

## C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION

9

Rural construction minister briefs commander and other officials of III Corps on revamped program for that area (p. 9); similar briefings planned for other corps areas through 18 December (p. 7); statistics on Chieu Hoi returnees given (p. 9).

Map, North Vietnam, facing page

10

## II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

10

## A. MILITARY

10

Three additional SAM sites in DRV confirmed this week (p. 10); SAM defenses responsible for loss of two US aircraft last week (p. 10); North Vietnamese fighters considerably more active in past weeks in areas of US air strikes, but still steering clear of US fighters (p. 10).

-ii-

25X1

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25X1

Page

B. POLITICAL

10

Hanoi propaganda attempting to offset Western press reports of Viet Cong reverses (p. 10); Liberation Front delegation to DRV viewed as effort to bolster Viet Cong morale (p. 10); DRV Foreign Ministry issues second statement in two weeks condemning US build-up in South (p. 11); new Peking blast at Soviet leaders is probably admonition to Hanoi against reliance on Moscow (p. 11);

III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

13

A. SOUTH KOREA

13

South Vietnamese Premier Ky visits Seoul (p. 13); advisability of friendship treaty, discussed during visit, to be pursued through diplomatic channels (p. 13); Ky told press in Seoul he opposed peace talks now and that US air strikes should be stepped up to destroy DRV war potential (p. 13);

25X1

B. US BOMBING OF DMZ

13

Navigational error again cause of US bombing of DMZ (p. 13); ICC discussed stiff protest from Hanoi over incident (p. 14).

ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Weekly)  
US Combat Figures in Vietnam (Weekly)  
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Incidents (Monthly)  
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Weapons Losses (Monthly)  
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Personnel Losses (Monthly)

(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, INR; it is edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)

-iii-

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## THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE


Combat activity in South Vietnam intensified last week, continuing through the weekend with the largest US operation of the war being launched in western Pleiku Province against regular North Vietnamese forces comparable in size to at least one division. COMUSMACV has confirmed the presence in II Corps of at least eight Communist regiments, two of them Viet Cong and six North Vietnamese.

The political situation revealed increased signs of restiveness, particularly among Catholic circles and some evidence of increasing assertiveness by I Corps commander General Thi. While there is greater press discussion of the lack of real political stability, there continue to be no signs of an imminent threat to the regime.

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## I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

### A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Premier Ky returned from his official visit to South Korea on 14 November. On the 17th he was scheduled to visit South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province to preside over a distribution of land titles to former tenant farmers.

2. During Ky's absence, there were further signs of restiveness in the political situation in Saigon. Various leaders of the Catholic community, who had hinted in a communiqué issued the previous week at their discontent with certain government policies, confirmed their growing concern in conversations last week with US Embassy officers. Characterizing the communiqué as nothing more than a mild warning to the regime, several priests told the embassy that they had presented Chief of State Thieu with a list of five specific matters which they considered prejudicial to their interests and in need of government action. They requested, among other things, an official definition of their juridical status (a step that had recently been taken for the Buddhists and the politico-religious sects) and legal disposition of the cases of certain Catholics recently arrested on unspecific charges.

3. The Catholic leaders told the embassy that they had given no publicity to their set of grievances, and planned no overt action against the government at this time. They left the impression that they might consider other forms of protest, however, if the government took no corrective action. The Catholics also left little doubt that their major source of concern was not so much the performance of Generals Thieu or Ky as the influence of a government clique which they suspect of being in league with militant Buddhist monk Tri Quang. They identified the members of this clique as I Corps commander General Thi, Police Director General Lieu, and the secretaries of psychological warfare and social welfare.

4. Also apparent during Ky's absence was an increased assertiveness on the part of General Thi and



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certain of his present backers, who tried to arrange a celebration, for the first time, of the anniversary of the abortive paratroop coup of 11 November 1960 against the Diem regime. Among the organizers were Thi, Police Director Lieu, and the present 25th Division commander, all of whom took part in the coup. The group succeeded in having commemorative services held by both the Catholics and Buddhists, but was denied last-minute permission to hold a celebration in a government-owned convention hall. This government rebuke prompted criticism from some of the politicians present at the celebration, which was finally held in Thi's Saigon residence. Among these politicians were former civilian chief of state Phan Khac Suu and Gia Dinh Province councilman Phan Quang Dan, both of whom are pressing behind the scenes for some form of elected popular assembly, and Bui Luong, an opportunistic labor leader with possible Nationalist Party (VNQDD) ties who in the past month has attached himself to General Thi.

5. While in Saigon, General Thi held a press conference in which he stressed his efforts to root out corruption in I Corps. He was questioned about charges, apparently stemming from Dai Viet Party sources in I Corps, that he is financially subsidizing the militant student newspaper in Hué, Sinh Vinh, which is becoming increasingly anti-American and pro-neutralist in tone. Thi admitted only that the paper continued to publish without interference and stressed that there was no press censorship in his corps area.

6. The departing South Vietnamese ambassador in Washington, General Tran Thien Khiem, commented last week that he considered Premier Ky merely a figure-head, behind whom maneuvering was under way for the fruits of what is now a clear US commitment to stay in South Vietnam. Khiem described the chief contestants for power as General Thieu, pushed by Dai Viet Party members, and General Thi, backed by still unidentified VNQDD members; he discounted any close ties between Thi and Tri Quang. Khiem's remarks were made in the context of his own plans to proceed about 1 December directly to his new post in Taiwan rather than try to return to Saigon where he might be associated with recent coup rumors. Khiem also added that he did not

-2-

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agree with Ky's apparent policy of trying to inspire an Asian anti-Communist military alliance, which he termed unrealistic. He commented that Ky might better spend his time trying to unify disparate military and civilian elements in South Vietnam.

7. The Saigon press, including both Buddhist and Catholic-oriented newspapers, has also begun to comment less optimistically about the prospects for developing real political stability. Particularly apparent in press editorials are insinuations that the government has not yet won any significant popular enthusiasm, and statements of concern that it may permit its prerogatives in administering the country and running the war to be usurped by the US.

8. A Vietnamese military court of the III Corps area on 16 November handed down sentences in the trial of some 18 Vietnamese charged with treason for running a Viet Cong propaganda ring in the Saigon - Gia Dinh Province area. The ringleader was given a death sentence, and the others were sentenced to prison-terms --mostly to less than seven years, although one man got 20 years. A Viet Cong Liberation Radio broadcast on 11 November warned of possible retaliation in the event of execution of any of the 18 "patriots."

9. The Viet Cong have in the past week apparently instigated a larger than usual number of popular demonstrations, involving from 100 to 1,000 villagers, around district capitals in I, II, and III Corps. These demonstrations, protesting air and artillery strikes and demanding the release of relatives from South Vietnamese military service, seem to reflect a carefully coordinated attempt to display Communist influence near populated centers, as well as an effort to foment hostility toward the American role in Vietnam.

#### Economic Situation

10. Retail prices continued the downward trend which began last week. Once again rice prices eased and are expected to hold near present levels through December. For the first time in several weeks the price of cement dropped, declining 13 percent from the previous week. This break in the upward trend of cement

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prices is thought to be attributable to the arrival of one shipload of cement and the anticipated arrival of a second.

11. South Vietnam's maritime union, representing stevedores for some 13 government-owned coastal ships, last week went out on strike for wage increases, reportedly denied them for the past ten years. The effect was to reduce total tonnage to the level available two months ago--i.e., to about half the 54,000-metric-ton monthly requirements--and to leave USOM-chartered ships to fill the gap. A recent press report indicates that the government has agreed to raise almost double the present salaries of the 300 union members. One factor prompting the strike may have been the higher rates paid to dockworkers by US and other foreign shippers, as well as to certain categories of workers employed in constructing new US base facilities. Despite rising labor costs and some labor shortages, US and South Vietnamese officials have agreed not to set wage ceilings for Vietnamese under US contract, but rather to stress training for needed categories of laborers.

12. The embassy in Saigon has given economic reasons supporting General Westmoreland's recent proposal that out-of-country rest and rehabilitation centers be set up, on the grounds that this might reduce inflationary pressure generated by piaster expenditures of US soldiers and civilians during off-duty hours. The embassy estimates that encouraging GIs to curtail expenditures in Vietnam in anticipation of R&R in another country would reduce off-duty spending by about 7 billion piasters in 1966. The governor of Penang (Malaysia) told an American businessman that he would be most favorable to the establishment of an R&R center in Penang. Federal Malaysian approval has not yet been sought.

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## B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. Combat activity increased during the past week, particularly in the III Corps, with both the tempo and intensity of the war continuing high through the weekend. The largest US-initiated operation of the war, SILVER BAYONET, began on 14 November in south-west Pleiku near the Cambodian border, with elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (US) confronting North Vietnamese (PAVN) regular forces equivalent to at least division size. Casualty totals during SILVER BAYONET already exceed those recorded in the US Marine victory near Chu Lai in August.

2. Communist personnel losses for the week ending 13 November increased sharply to 1,173 from the previous week's 733; 981 were killed and 192 captured, compared with 536 and 197 a week ago. The kill ratio for the week favored South Vietnamese forces 6 to 1. The number of weapons lost by the enemy--343, including 29 crew-served weapons--was the third highest weekly figure this year. The figures of 89 US combat deaths and 230 wounded set new weekly highs of the war, for the second successive week.

3. The Viet Cong incident total for 7-13 November was 768, compared with 731 the previous period--exceeding 700 for the sixth consecutive week. The usual pattern of incidents prevailed, with terrorism accounting for more than half.

### GVN/Allied Activities

4. Results of friendly major operations were generally favorable, with one exception: BLUE MARLIN (Phase I), a combined US and Vietnamese Marine multi-battalion search-and-destroy operation on 11 and 12 November. No major contact was made in this operation although several Viet Cong battalions were believed to be in the area. Interrogation of villagers indicated that the Viet Cong had about two days foreknowledge.

5. In the SILVER BAYONET operation this week, a major enemy infiltration and base area appears to have been encountered. Elements of at least four PAVN regiments have been identified in the area.

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The intensity of the action is illustrated by casualty totals at the end of three days' fighting: 88 friendly troops killed and 118 wounded. The PAVN troops so far have suffered 637 killed (body count) and 16 captured.

6. The final results of Operation HUMP, a search-and-destroy effort in Bien Hoa Province on 7 and 8 November, involving the 173d Airborne Brigade (US) and Australian elements, were: 48 US and two Australians killed; 101 US and six Australians wounded; 423 Viet Cong confirmed killed, 123 Viet Cong captured, and 15 ralliers taken.

7. The final Viet Cong body count following a seven-hour battle north of Ben Cat on 12 November between 1st Infantry Division (US) elements and unidentified guerrilla forces showed 198 Viet Cong dead. US losses were 20 killed and 83 wounded.

8. A marked decrease in contacts with suspected Viet Cong junks was noted; apparently surf conditions at river mouths and inlets have curtailed their activities. The seasonal increase in the number of junks at sea during the northeast monsoon has not yet materialized. Results of sea, river, and coastal force surveillance again declined, with 4,848 junks and 18,462 persons searched.

9. B-52 raids were flown against 11 targets in Long Khanh, Binh Long, Binh Duong, and Pleiku provinces, bringing the over-all total of such strikes to 73 as of 15 November.

#### Viet Cong - Initiated Activities

10. Seven Viet Cong attacks, three of large proportion, were reported, with the major combat activity taking place in II and III Corps. Main force elements challenged two US units and attempted to ambush an ARVN Ranger Battalion.

11. In the I Corps, the majority of Viet Cong incidents consisted of harassment of the US Marines in the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas. There also were several local demonstrations protesting air strikes and artillery



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fire. A new unidentified regiment (probably PAVN) consisting of three battalions, is believed to be in the Ba Long Valley area of Quang Tri Province.

12. Actions in Pleiku Province involving the 1st Air Cavalry Division (US) highlighted activities in the II Corps. Two captives have indicated they were members of the 304th Division (PAVN). One claimed to be from the 66th Regiment and the other stated he was a member of the 19th Transportation Battalion. A new PAVN regiment, temporarily designated the Song Lam Regiment, has also been confirmed by COMUSMACV in the II Corps. Confirmed Viet Cong and PAVN regiments in the II Corps now total eight.


13. The intensity of Viet Cong activity in III Corps increased, with two battalion-size contacts reported, both apparently designed to lure ARVN reaction forces into prepared ambushes. Both efforts were repulsed, and friendly losses were light. A well-equipped Viet Cong battalion of the 271st Regiment (VC) engaged elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade (US) near War Zone D in Bien Hoa Province, during Operation HUMP. Australian elements encountered a Viet Cong company south of the Dong Nai River during the same action. It was noted in both engagements that the Viet Cong maintained close contact in an attempt to reduce their losses from air strikes and artillery. A strong Viet Cong battalion engaged elements of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (US) during a road-clearing operation on Route 13, north of Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province. After a seven-hour battle, the Viet Cong broke contact, having suffered heavy casualties. The Viet Cong attempted to ambush the 52d Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and a Regional Force company along Route 15 north of Vung Tau, Phuoc Tuy Province. Compromise of the ambush by a Viet Cong defector permitted the Rangers, supported by close air support, artillery, and naval gunfire, to deploy and attack the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong lost 131 killed. Friendly losses were 17 killed and nine wounded.

14. Viet Cong activity in the IV Corps remains concentrated in the provinces which encompass the principal movement route from the IV Corps to northwestern III Corps. An ARVN reaction force was attacked

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## CURRENT STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND THE COASTAL RAILROAD



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by the Viet Cong in Kien Giang Province on 9 November. Friendly losses were 35 killed, 21 wounded, and 24 missing. Viet Cong losses are unknown.

15. National Route 1 is closed in Thua Thien, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Ninh Thuan, and Binh Thuan provinces. In Quang Tri Province, Route 9 is closed. Route 14 is closed north of Kontum City, south of Pleiku City, south of Gia Nghia, and in Phuoc Long and Binh Long provinces. Route 7 is closed in Phu Bon and Phu Yen provinces. The national railroad is closed between Xuan Loc (Long Khanh Province) and Song Luy (Binh Thuan Province); between Ninh Hoa (Khanh Hoa Province) and Hué (Thua Thien Province); and north of Dong Ha (Quang Tri Province).

16. For the present, the enemy maintains the capability of conducting commando-type attacks against base areas, airfields and other friendly facilities, with the object of immobilizing a maximum number of allied combat troops defending these areas. The continuing buildup of enemy forces, coupled with current dispositions, particularly in II and III Corps, gives the enemy an increasing capability for surprise attacks and ambushes with one or more regiments.

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C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION

1. South Vietnam's minister of rural construction, General Nguyen Duc Thang, recently briefed the commander of III Corps, as well as division commanders and province chiefs from that corps, on the objectives and guidelines of 1966 plans, programs, and budgets for the rural construction effort. Under the revamped program, corps commanders will be involved in the national rural construction planning effort, while the supervision of provincial plans is being passed to division commanders, who previously have had no official responsibility for the rural construction effort in the provinces.

2. Briefings of involved officials are planned for the other corps areas. Following these briefings, the individual provinces are to prepare plans, coordinate them with the divisions, and hold final review sessions at the corps level. These review sessions now are set for the period 20 November through 18 December. Very little time seems to have been allowed by the national planning authorities for the coordination and meshing of the various corps plans into a national plan by the established 1 January deadline.

3. Chieu Hoi returnees numbered 438 during the past week, as against the previous week's total of 368. The largest single category of returnee was the military, with 217--only 12 more, however, than reported for the previous week. Civilian returnees numbered 177, as compared with last week's total of 108. Forty-three political cadres rallied to the government during the week, as did one draft dodger/deserter; in these categories last week the returnees numbered 50 and 5, respectively.

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## II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

### A. MILITARY

1. Three additional surface-to-air missile sites in the DRV were confirmed in aerial photography this week bringing the total number of SAM sites to 44. Two of the new sites are northwest of Hanoi, the third is located near Ninh Binh, south of Hanoi. Two SAM sites (39 and 41) were struck by US aircraft this week; bomb damage assessment is not yet available.

2. SAM defenses were responsible for the loss of two US aircraft last week while five others were lost to groundfire and one was lost for mechanical reasons. Of the 160 aircraft lost to date over North Vietnam, eight have been shot down by SAMs.

3. North Vietnamese fighters have become considerably more active in the past several weeks in areas of US air strikes. Several attempts have been made to attack US support aircraft such as reconnaissance and rescue aircraft. One such engagement occurred on 15 November when two unmarked MIGs attempted unsuccessfully to engage two US RF-101 photoreconnaissance aircraft in the vicinity of Yen Bai. DRV fighters have steered clear of armed US fighters, however.

### B. POLITICAL

1. Hanoi, in its propaganda and public statements in the past week, has attempted to offset reports in the Western press that the Viet Cong have suffered reverses since the "massive buildup" of US combat forces in South Vietnam. The DRV press has listed a series of recent battles in the South as resounding victories for the insurgents and as further proof that the Viet Cong are still fighting vigorously and are defeating large US units.

2. Regime propaganda also announced that the Liberation Front had dispatched a delegation of "military heroes" to the DRV on 15 November to express the "solidarity of the South Vietnamese people against US

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aggression." Overt contacts of any kind between the DRV party and government and the front are extremely limited, and this unusual action may be another hint that Hanoi is taking measures to bolster Viet Cong morale. The delegation will probably receive the royal treatment from the North Vietnamese, and its activities will undoubtedly be extensively reported in the DRV press. A sign of the importance with which the DRV assigns to this move was the issuance of an editorial in the party daily describing the delegation's mission and purpose.

3. In addition, the DRV Foreign Ministry on 16 November issued its second statement in two weeks condemning the increase in US forces in South Vietnam. This statement and an editorial on the same subject the following day denounced alleged US violations of the Geneva agreements and asserted that the Vietnamese people are resolute in their determination to fight against US imperialism. Both the editorial and the official statement laid heavy emphasis on the possible effect which the cost of the war and recent anti-Vietnam activities in the US may have on bringing about a change in American policy.

4. A polemical blast at the Soviet leadership by Peking on 11 November was almost certainly intended as a sharp admonition to Hanoi against reliance on Moscow and a warning against alleged Soviet efforts to promote a negotiated settlement. Attacking Breshnev and Kosygin by name, the Chinese asserted in the People's Daily and Red Flag that the Soviet leaders have ulterior motives in giving aid--dismissed as a "certain amount" in no way commensurate with Soviet capabilities--and are in fact doing so only to keep the situation in Vietnam "under their control with the object of striking a "bargain with the US on it."

5. Last February, the article charged, the Soviets had proposed to Peking and Hanoi that a new international conference on Vietnam be called "without prior conditions." This proposal, the Chinese asserted, was nothing more than advocacy of "unconditional negotiations." When this effort failed, the Soviets allegedly proceeded unilaterally to discuss the question with the French,

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and communicated Moscow's desire for negotiations to various other Communist parties. According to Peking, the Soviets then went on to collaborate with the Indians and Yugoslavs in their efforts to act as "brokers" in the Vietnam question.

6. The Chinese made it clear that they have no intention of moderating their criticism of Soviet policy in Vietnam and issued what amounted to a demand that Hanoi follow Peking's lead. This latest outburst may reflect anger over recent indications that the North Vietnamese are continuing to take a middle position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

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### III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

#### A. SOUTH KOREA

1. Accompanied by his ministers of defense, economy, and psychological warfare, South Vietnamese Premier Ky made an official visit to South Korea from 8 to 12 November. The final communiqué on the visit stated that Ky and Korean Prime Minister Il Kwon Chung had discussed the advisability of concluding a treaty of friendship between their countries and had agreed that details on this matter would be further examined through diplomatic channels.

2. During his stay in Seoul, Ky held a press conference in which he stated that he would "never sit at a conference table to talk peace with the Communists." He said that any Communist proposal for negotiations would be "for the purpose of tricking us." In discussions with US Embassy officers, Ky and other GVN officials have stated that the GVN would be thrown into disarray if it entered into negotiations at the present juncture. Ky also stated at his press conference that it would be preferable to destroy the North Vietnamese war potential rather than to conduct bombings in the limited fashion now being pursued. Ky also urged an alliance of non-Communist Asian nations.

#### B. US BOMBING OF DMZ

1. Another US bombing of the Demilitarized Zone took place on the morning of 13 November, in which, because of a navigational error, several passes were made at the Ben Hai bridge in the Demilitarized Zone and one South Vietnamese policeman was killed. The US Embassy has expressed regret to the GVN Foreign Ministry for the bombing. A Hué consulate official who visited the area shortly after the incident reported that villagers appeared very upset. A family from one of the damaged houses had fled to another

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village, and police officers report that others say they would like to leave.

2. The ICC met on 15 November to discuss a stiff protest from Hanoi regarding the incident. The Canadians told the US Embassy that neither the Indian nor the Polish representative seemed unduly exercised. The Pole suggested that the ICC address itself directly to the United States instead of the GVN, arguing that the US was the responsible party; the Canadians opposed this move successfully. The ICC then addressed a letter to the GVN liaison mission, asking for a full report. The ICC also asked its team in the Demilitarized Zone to carry on its normal activities and to give it a full report of the incident. Members of the team were apparently crossing the Ben Hai bridge when the bombing took place.

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


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## SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965

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WEEKLY REPORT

6 NOV - 13 NOV




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
# US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM



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## VIET CONG ATTACKS



South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and  
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 October 1965

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action GVN	VC	Wounded in Action GVN	VC	Captured or Missing GVN	VC	Total Casualties GVN	VC	Weapons Losses GVN	VC
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	116	390	890	1896	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	-	232	529	2473	2433	757	973
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	882
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074

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Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2563	878	329
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2473	655	3485	1724	-	266	838	2645	4323	778	838
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
	1965	3330	961	3874	2416	-	225	660	3602	4534	762	1013
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2955	-	-
	1963	1921	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666

## Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
**1965	23785	8970	25844	18800	-	6402	5218	34172	31062	14061	8433

\*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

\*\*Through 31 October 1965

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## 2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 October 1965

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft
		Small- Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size	Total				
1962	1825	528	0	21	549	839	180	257	--
Jan 1963	927	242	2	8	252	447	49	179	--
1964	1770	218	3	2	223	1244	129	174	--
1965	2206	57	1	5	63	1489	272	170	212
1962	1460	480	0	20	500	613	137	210	--
Feb 1963	788	181	1	13	195	433	69	91	--
1964	2078	211	3	3	217	1389	201	271	--
1965	1982	73	3	6	82	1411	267	91	131
1962	1961	561	0	27	588	660	290	423	--
Mar 1963	1282	333	0	11	344	653	131	154	--
1964	2160	198	1	4	203	1632	158	167	--
1965	2056	80	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
1962	1933	470	0	27	497	1024	220	192	--
Apr 1963	1331	371	3	9	383	688	105	155	--
1964	2284	211	3	6	220	1738	169	157	--
1965	1860	38	4	1	43	1407	149	96	165
1962	1825	490	0	28	528	892	154	251	--
May 1963	1208	344	0	13	357	608	93	150	--
1964	2143	170	2	3	175	1418	217	140	193
1965	2263	40	11	7	58	1555	365	115	170
1962	1477	339	0	23	362	736	157	222	--
Jun 1963	1311	398	1	11	410	652	107	142	--
1964	2062	128	2	10	140	1390	176	162	194
1965	2597	62	6	1	69	1784	469	103	172
1962	1564	437	1	10	448	735	158	223	--
Jul 1963	1368	398	1	8	407	698	80	183	--
1964	3045	166	7	12	185	2132	286	224	218
1965	2520	42	6	0	48	1706	400	154	212
1962	1642	368	0	10	378	885	146	233	--
Aug 1963	1349	356	1	11	368	647	113	221	--
1964	2580	107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204
1965	2498	38	5	9	52	1597	349	200	300

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Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft	
		Small-Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size	Total					
Sep	1962	1375	382	0	9	391	624	178	182	--
	1963	1763	483	3	17	503	889	164	207	--
	1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
	1965	2473	19	5	7	31	1530	278	185	449
Oct	1962	1357	406	1	12	419	583	189	166	--
	1963	1422	359	0	6	365	802	105	150	--
	1964	2827	75	6	2	83	1790	480	197	277
	1965	3330	24	12	8	44	1969	415	198	704
Nov	1962	1311	411	3	7	421	614	144	132	--
	1963	3182	631	3	11	645	1990	269	278	--
	1964	1982	57	1	2	60	1391	247	109	175
Dec	1962	1346	375	1	8	384	670	107	185	--
	1963	1921	258	0	3	261	1298	111	251	--
	1964	2504	81	6	9	96	1719	318	128	243

## Composite Annual Totals

1962	19076	5247	6	212	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17852	4354	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28526	1732	41	60	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
1965	23785	473	56	47	576	15924	3204	1402	2679

Through 31 October 1965

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
# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

## MONTHLY REPORT

OCTOBER

### PERSONNEL LOSSES

(KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)



\*Wounded not included. Viet Cong figures unavailable.

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
# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

## MONTHLY REPORT

OCTOBER

### WEAPONS LOSSES

#### VIETNAM AND VIET CONG



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
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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

## MONTHLY REPORT

OCTOBER

### INCIDENTS - VIET CONG



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
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